On the difficulty of achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication by Gonzalez Troncoso, Carmela et al.
Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxxContents lists available at ScienceDirect
Computer Networks
journal homepage: www.elsevier .com/ locate/comnetOn the difficulty of achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication
Carmela Troncoso a,⇑, Enrique Costa-Montenegro b, Claudia Diaz a, Stefan Schiffner a
aK.U. Leuven/IBBT, ESAT/SCD-COSIC, 3001 Heverlee-Leuven, Belgium
bDepartamento de Enxeñería Telemática - Universidade de Vigo ETSE Telecomunicación, 36310 Vigo, Spaina r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Available online xxxx
Keywords:
Privacy
Anonymity
Vehicle-2-X communications
IntelliDrive1389-1286/$ - see front matter  2011 Elsevier B.V
doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2011.05.004
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +32 16321045.
E-mail addresses: Carmela.Troncoso@esat.kuleuv
kike@det.uvigo.es (E. Costa-Montenegro).
Please cite this article in press as: C. Troncoso
Netw. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2011.05.0a b s t r a c t
Vehicle-2-X communications are hailed as the future to improve safety on the roads.
Ensuring that messages sent by vehicles contain correct information is crucial to fulfill this
objective, as misleading information could disrupt traffic and create potentially dangerous
situations. Thus, Vehicle-2-X communication requires authentication to ensure that mes-
sages come from legitimate vehicles, and to identify vehicles that send misleading informa-
tion. If a unique public key certificate per vehicle is used to authenticate messages, then the
identification of misbehaving (or malfunctioning) vehicles is straightforward, and so is the
revocation of their credentials. This solution however, offers no privacy protection to driv-
ers, as the tracking of all the vehicles’ movements is equally trivial. A privacy-preserving
alternative is to authenticate messages using (unlinkable) one-time pseudonyms, but these
protocols are computationally expensive and their certificate revocation process is more
complex. Intermediate solutions that trade off privacy and efficiency are based on multiple
certificates per vehicle, which may or may not be unique, that are reused to authenticate
messages. In this work we analyze two such intermediate solutions that have been pro-
posed by IntelliDrive, US Department of Transportation (DoT). We show that by exploiting
the reuse of pseudonyms and spatio-temporal constraints the service provider is capable of
tracking a large percentage of vehicles. Furthermore, we find that one of the schemes fails
to provide privacy even if the adversary does not control the service provider and only lis-
tens to the communications of vehicles.
 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
IntelliDrive [3] is an initiative of the USA DoT supported
by a coalition of Federal, state and local transportation
agencies, trade associations, and vehicle manufacturers –
such as BMW, Chrysler, Ford, Honda, Mercedes-Benz, etc.
The IntelliDrive program is ultimately focused on deploy-
ment, and its results are used by several Federal associa-
tions (e.g. the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration) to assess the safety and effectiveness of
V2X applications in order to decide whether to pursue a
rulemaking process to require or encourage this technol-
ogy on some or all vehicles [23].. All rights reserved.
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04IntelliDrive has designed a framework in which vehicles
use dedicated short-range communications (such as the
IEEE 1609 standard family [2]) to send messages to other
vehicles and to the Roadside Equipment (RSE). One of the
main concerns related to the deployment of V2X commu-
nication networks is to ensure that vehicles send accurate
information. This is crucial to protect the physical safety of
drivers, as misleading information on the status of the road
may prove fatal. Therefore, the system must be capable of
isolating misbehaving users (who have sent misleading
messages), and must prevent those users from sending fur-
ther messages by revoking their authentication creden-
tials. A second concern relates to the protection of the
drivers’ privacy. The fact that vehicles interact with their
environment may allow the service provider, or even pas-
sive eavesdroppers, to track vehicles and thus infer privatef achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
2 C. Troncoso et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxxinformation about their drivers [20,18,14,16]. A discussion
on the consequences of losing location privacy can be
found in [7].
The IntelliDrive framework attempts to reconcile
authentication and privacy requirements by using anony-
mous certificates that allow vehicles to send authenticated
messages without revealing their actual identity
[10,11,26]. The goal of these anonymous certificates, opti-
mized for scalability, easy certificate management and rev-
ocation, is to ensure that the IntelliDrive service provider
(or other entities) cannot link the message received at a
particular location to the vehicle that sent it, and thus to
preserve the anonymity of drivers and prevent vehicle
tracking. Moreover, in case of repeated misbehavior, mali-
cious vehicles lose their ability to renew anonymous certif-
icates and thus to send messages (once all their certificates
have been revoked).
In this work we show that both schemes [10,11,26] fail
to prevent the service provider from tracking vehicles and
re-identifying their drivers. We present two attacks that
exploit the time and location where anonymous certifi-
cates are (re-)used. We have tested the effectiveness of
our attacks through software simulations, discovering that
even in heavy traffic conditions the service provider suc-
ceeds in reconstructing most of the trajectories followed
by vehicles. Further, we have also considered a weaker
adversary, who does not know how sets of certificates have
been distributed to vehicles (i.e., does not control the ser-
vice provider and can only eavesdrop on the communica-
tions of vehicles). We find that one of the schemes, based
on shared certificates [10,26], is also vulnerable to this
adversary model. The attack reveals the sets of certificates
associated with most vehicles, and recovers the trajecto-
ries that they have followed.
It has been shown that an individual can often be un-
iquely identified by just obtaining the approximate loca-
tions of her home and work place [14], and that these
locations can be found by studying the movement patterns
of vehicles [20] (e.g., vehicles are likely to spend the night
at their home location). Thus, our results imply that driv-
ers’ privacy would be compromised if any of the two anon-
ymous certificate schemes in [10,11,26] were deployed.
The key feature that is exploited by our attacks is the reuse
of certificates, suggesting that one-time pseudonyms are
necessary to achieve a reasonable level of location privacy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses related work. Section 3 describes the IntelliDrive
model and the studied anonymous certificate schemes. The
adversary model and attack algorithms are explained in
Section 4. We describe our experimental setup in Section
5 and the results of our evaluation in Section 6. We discuss
in Section 7 the implications of our experimental results
for real traffic scenarios and offer our conclusions in
Section 8.2. Related work
A large body of research [13,15,21,19] focuses on
achieving location privacy by hiding the actual location
of users from the service provider. In these approachesPlease cite this article in press as: C. Troncoso et al., On the difficulty o
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trusted proxy. This proxy is continuously aware of the
location of all users in the system, and uses this knowledge
to build cloaking regions in which they are k-anonymous
[25] (i.e., indistinguishable from at least k other users).
However, these solutions are not suitable for the Intelli-
Drive framework, as its main goal is to improve road safety
and mobility, and thus it requires knowledge of the exact
location of vehicles.
A second family of solutions uses mix zones [5,12] (re-
gions in which users do not communicate with the envi-
ronment), inside of which users change their credentials.
Therefore, it is not possible to perform tracking when sev-
eral users traverse a mix zone simultaneously. The model
in [5,12] considers that every time users authenticate, the
use a different certificate. Thus, the only information
available to the attacker is the time and location of mes-
sages. The IntelliDrive certificate management schemes
reuse certificates, and thus leak additional information
that can be exploited to improve tracking. This informa-
tion allows us to perform tracking across multiple mix
zones, contrary to [12] where the use of one-show certif-
icates ensures that after traversing several mix zones the
probability of following vehicles becomes negligible. The
analysis in [5], on the other hand, focuses only on an
isolated mix zone.
A theoretical analysis of shared certificates was pre-
sented in [17], which studies the tradeoffs between ano-
nymity towards the certification authorities and ease of
revocation, given that n certificates can be linked. The
paper finds that if the parameters of the certificate
scheme are adjusted to provide high levels of privacy
(i.e., each certificate is shared by many vehicles), then
the revocation mechanism performs poorly, as it revokes
all the certificates of many well-behaved vehicles (which
lose their ability to send messages). If on the other hand
the scheme is tuned to ensure a good revocation perfor-
mance (i.e., certificates are shared by few vehicles and
thus revocation only affects malicious vehicles) then the
levels of privacy are low. The main difference between
our study and the one by Haas et al. [17] is that we do
not assume that certificates are linked but instead provide
methods to do so. Yet, our results corroborate the theo-
retical analysis in [17]. Further, we show that shared cer-
tificates do not protect users’ privacy even if the service
provider is honest and certificate distribution information
is not available to the adversary.3. The IntelliDrive model
In the IntelliDrive model [10,26,11], vehicles communi-
cate with Road Side Equipment (RSE). Each vehicle has a
set of anonymous certificates G ¼ fc1; . . . ; cMg that are used
to authenticate messages. The certificates are designed to
prevent vehicles from being identified and tracked – i.e.,
no entity should be able to associate the certificate used
to authenticate a message with the vehicle that sent the
message, or to link messages as being sent by the same
vehicle. For this purpose the IntelliDrive uses Certificate
Authority Partitioning, and distributes the issuing off achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
C. Troncoso et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 3certificates between two authorities. The Authorizing Cer-
tificate Authority (ATA) issues long term vehicle identify-
ing certificates. The Assigning Certificate Authority (ASA)
issues anonymous certificates to vehicles. The ATA has no
knowledge of the vehicle’s anonymous certificates, while
the ASA does not know the long term vehicle identity.
Vehicles who persistently send malicious messages can
be identified because they have a higher rate of anony-
mous certificate revocations and corresponding certificate
requests than the other (honest) vehicles.
The IntelliDrive Consortium has proposed two methods
[10,26,11] for anonymous certificate management. Both
schemes have four parts: (i) key generation, (ii) key distri-
bution, (iii) key usage and management, and (iv) key revo-
cation and update. In this work we are only concerned with
key distribution, management and usage. For further de-
tails on the other aspects of the schemes we refer the read-
er to [10,26,11].3.1. Vehicle segment certificate management using short-
lived, unlinked certificate schemes
The first approach to achieve anonymity is described in
[11]. Vehicles receive short-lived certificates that are un-
ique and valid only for a short period of time (e.g., one or
two weeks) after which they expire. Upon expiration or
revocation the vehicle must request new certificates to
the ASA. It proceeds as follows (see Fig. 1):
1. The vehicle sends a request (R,EATA(Id)) to the ASA,
where EATA(Id) is an encryption of the vehicle’s identity
under the public key of the ATA.
2. The ASA forwards EATA(Id) to the ATA, who decrypts the
message and verifies whether or not the vehicle should
obtain new certificates (the decision is based on
whether or not the vehicle is suspected of sending mali-
cious messages). The ATA sends the result of the verifi-
cation to the ASA.
3. If the response from the ATA is positive, the ASA issues
new anonymous certificates to the vehicle.
The scheme in [11] assumes that the ATA is trusted not
to reveal the vehicle’s identity to the ASA. The ASA on the
other hand, is considered potentially adversarial. The secu-
rity goal of the scheme is to prevent the ASA from tracking
and re-identifying vehicles. To achieve this, the ASA must
not know the full set G of anonymous certificates assignedFig. 1. (a) Short-lived certificates scheme, and (b) shared certificates sch
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cates at the same time. One possibility would be to make
an individual request per certificate. To improve efficiency
by reducing the number of requests, it is suggested that
vehicles renew their anonymous certificates in small
batches [11].
Let G denote the full set of certificates of a vehicle, and
M be the number of certificates it contains, i.e.,M ¼j G j. Let
b be the size of the batch, withM = bb, where b is a positive
integer. When vehicles request new certificates to the ASA,
they obtain a batch gi = {ci,1, . . . ,ci,b} of b certificates, i.e.,
b = jgj. At any time, vehicles have M certificates grouped
in b independent batches of b elements, such that
G ¼ Sbi¼1gi.
Note that in this scheme the ASA knows how batches of
certificates have been issued; i.e., given two certificates cv
and cw, the ASA knows whether or not they belong to the
same batch. Thus, the security of the scheme relies on
the ASA not being able to link certificates from different
batches as belonging to the same vehicle.3.2. Vehicle segment certificate management using shared
certificate schemes
The second approach is presented in [10,26]. In this
scheme, shown in Fig. 1(b), the ASA creates a pool of N dis-
tinct anonymous certificates and then provides each vehi-
cle with a set G of M certificates, which are randomly
selected from the pool. Thus, in a population V of V vehi-
cles, each certificate is shared (on average) by k vehicles,
with k ¼ VMN .
The scheme in [10,26] is designed to protect vehicles
from being tracked by the ASA, assuming that the ASA
knows how certificates are grouped in sets (each corre-
sponding to a vehicle), and that it can see the messages
received by the RSE. The security of the scheme relies on
k-anonymity [25]. The key idea is that given a message
authenticated using certificate cv, the ASA cannot distin-
guish which among the k vehicles who received cv signed
the message.
When a certificate is used to authenticate a malicious
message, the ASA will revoke it. Vehicles sharing this cer-
tificate will need to request a new valid certificate, as in
the case of short-lived certificates. Note that in this scheme
new certificates are requested one-by-one, and that the
ASA updates the sets G that contained the revoked certifi-
cate with the new certificate.eme (M = 4). The h symbol represents an anonymous certificate.
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in the IntelliDrive framework
We have developed two attacks on the schemes for
vehicular communications presented in the previous
section. The first attack is based on a brute-force search
of possible vehicle routes, taking into account that the
vehicles use shared certificates as described in Section
3.2. The second attack is based on heuristic clustering tech-
niques and it applies to the short-lived certificates de-
scribed in Section 3.1. Note that both attacks operate on
information collected at the application layer, and are
oblivious of issues at the network or transport layers.4.1. Attacker model
Assuming that the ATA is honest and does not reveal the
identity of the vehicles nor learn their location, the goal of
the schemes in [11,10,26] is to provide privacy towards the
ASA and the RSE. We note that this threat model is
common in the literature [5,22], and that it is described
in Annex F of the 1609. 2 WAVE standard [1]. In this paper,
we evaluate the security of [11,10,26] against this strong
attacker. Moreover, we consider a weak attacker who just
observes interactions between the vehicles and the RSE,
as shown in Fig. 2.
For each message, the adversary collects a tuple
T i ¼ ðcv ; la; tiÞ, where cv is the anonymous certificate used
by the vehicle, la is the location of the antenna, and ti is
the time when the communication took place. In addition,
the attacker estimates the time that vehicles take to travel
between each pair of adjacent RSE devices in different traf-
fic conditions. This can be done, for instance, by covering
the routes several times and collecting samples of the time
it takes to travel between RSE locations. Given a pair of
locations la and lb, we denote as Pra,b[t] the probability that
a vehicle travels from la to lb in time less or equal than t
(i.e., Pra,b[t] is a cumulative distribution function). Pra,b[t]
can be used to decide whether or not two tuples T i and
T j, collected at locations la and lb respectively, could possi-
bly correspond to the same vehicle. Let c be a parameter
such that 0 < c 6 1. We consider that T i and T j might refer
to the same vehicle if Pra,b[tj  ti] < c.Fig. 2. Weak and strong adversary models (a) and cumulative distribu
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a tuple T 1 ¼ ðc1; la; t1Þ from a message received at location
la. After some time, two messages are received at location
lb, with associated tuples T 2 ¼ ðc2; lb; t2Þ and T 3 ¼ ðc3; lb;
t3Þ. As we can see in the upper part of the figure,
Pra,b[t2  t1] < c, while Pra,b[t3  t1] > c. The adversary
concludes that T 3 cannot belong to the same trajectory
as T 1 because they are too far apart in time. On the other
hand, T 2 was received within the expected time frame,
and thus T 1 and T 2 may originate from the same vehicle.
Moreover, we assume the attacker knows the city lay-
out (i.e., the allowed and forbidden directions and turns)
and uses this information when deciding whether two
tuples may or may not correspond to a vehicle’s trajectory.
Attacker’s goal. The goal of the adversary is to track vehi-
cles. For this she tries to link the observed tuples so that
they reveal the vehicles’ trajectories. The adversary ex-
ploits two types of constraints: first, space–time con-
straints (e.g., a vehicle cannot travel one kilometer in one
second), and second, constraints imposed by the anony-
mous certificate schemes (e.g., a vehicle has M different
certificates). It has been shown that tracking enables driver
re-identification [14], and the inference of other private
information [18]. To recover trajectories weak adversaries
only use the information extracted from the tuples (i.e.,
certificate, time, and location). Strong adversaries also use
the certificate distribution information available to the
ASA. In the case of shared certificates, the adversary knows
the complete set G of M certificates assigned to each vehi-
cle. When short-lived certificates are used, the adversary
only knows the grouping in batches gi of b certificates.
Attacker’s success. We consider that the attack succeeds
when the adversary learns all the certificates belonging to
a vehicle and recovers the vehicle’s full trajectory. This is a
strong definition of success, as private information could
be compromised even if the attacker only learns partial
trajectories or an incomplete set of certificates.4.2. Brute-force clustering
In this section we present a brute-force clustering
algorithm to reconstruct vehicle trajectories when shared
certificates are implemented. The key idea is to exploretion function describing the time needed to go from la to lb (b).
f achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
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tent with the constraints. The attack succeeds if the actual
trajectory of a vehicle is the only one that satisfies all the
constraints.
The algorithm takes as input the messages sent by vehi-
cles to the RSE. Each of these messages is represented by a
tuple T i ¼ ðcv ; la; tiÞ, as defined in the previous section. The
adversary orders the list of tuples chronologically.
The attack starts by taking the first tuple, T 1, and con-
structing a tree that has T 1 as its root node. The tree is built
in a breadth-first manner. To find the next point in the tra-
jectory of the vehicle that sent the message represented by
T 1, the adversary compiles an list of candidate children
nodes. These candidates are the tuples T j ¼ ðcw; lb; tjÞ that
satisfy the following conditions:
1. Location lb is adjacent to location la.
2. Pra,b[tj  t1] < c.
The attacker then checks that candidate trajectories
(branches of the tree) are consistent with the parameters
of the shared certificate scheme. A branch is consistent if
the path between the leaf and the root node contains at
most M different certificates, and inconsistent if adding it
contains M + 1 certificates (including the leaf’s certificate
cw). The attacker discards branches which do not pass this
consistency check. The algorithm is iterated to find candi-
date children of the remaining tree leafs, until no more
tuples can be added to the tree. At this point, if only one
branch remains, the adversary considers that the tuples
in the branch describe a vehicle’s trajectory. Those tuples
are removed from the list, as they cannot belong to any
other vehicle, and the algorithm proceeds starting from
the earliest remaining tuple. If on the other hand the tree
has more than one branch left, the adversary considers that
the attack has failed. The root tuple T 1 is discarded and a
new tree is constructed starting from tuple T 2.
Let us illustrate this process with the example shown in
Fig. 3. There are two vehicles in this scenario (represented
as s and h, respectively). Each of them has M = 2 anony-
mous certificates and they choose randomly which certifi-
cate to use for each communication. The vehicles send in
total five messages to four RSE devices, located in la, lb, lc,
and ld. Thus, the observation of the adversary is repre-
sented by the list of tuples fT 1 ¼ fc1; la; t1g; T 2 ¼ fc2; lb;
t2g; T 3 ¼ fc3; lb; t3g; T 4 ¼ fc4; ld; t4g; T 5 ¼ fc2; lc; t5gg.
The adversary selects T 1 ¼ ðc1; la; t1Þ as root node for
the tree, and searches for possible successors. Let us con-
sider that in this example both T 2 and T 3 are possible suc-
cessors (i.e., Pra,b[t2  t1] < c and Pra,b[t3  t1] < c). The
adversary now performs a consistency check taking into
account that M = 2. Both branches pass the consistencyFig. 3. Brute-force clustering.
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ferent certificates.
In the next step, the adversary searches for possible suc-
cessors to tuple T 2. We consider that Prb,d[t4  t2] < c and
Prb,c[t5  t2] < c, and thus both T 4 and T 5 are candidate
successors to T 2. The adversary then checks the consis-
tency of the branches with the shared certificate scheme
parameters. As we can see, the branch formed by
fT 1; T 2; T 4g cannot represent the trajectory of a vehicle,
as it contains three different certificates {c1,c2,c4}. The
branch formed by fT 1; T 2; T 5g on the other hand does pass
the test, as it only contains two different certificates {c1,c2}.
The attacker repeats the algorithm to find the candidate
successors of tuple T 3. We consider that Prb,d[t4  t3] < c
and Prb,c[t5  t3] < c. None of the two resulting branches
ðfT 1; T 3; T 4g and fT 1; T 3; T 5gÞ passes the certificate con-
sistency check though. In both cases, branches contain
three different certificates, and thus they cannot describe
the trajectory of the vehicle that starts its trip at location la.
At this point no more tuples can be added to the tree,
which has only one branch left (formed by tuples
fT 1; T 2; T 5g). Thus, the adversary considers that the algo-
rithm has succeeded in tracking the vehicle with certifi-
cates {c1,c2}, which passed by la at t1, by lb at t2, and by lc
at t5. Tuples fT 1; T 2; T 5g are removed from the list, as they
cannot belong to another trajectory. The adversary pro-
ceeds to create a new tree starting from the first tuple in
the new list (i.e., T 3) in order to track another vehicle.4.3. Heuristic clustering
In this section we present a heuristic clustering algo-
rithm to reconstruct vehicle trajectories when short-lived
certificates are implemented. We recall that short-lived
certificates are unique (i.e., they are not shared by various
vehicles). Therefore, tracking a vehicle vi is trivial once the
adversary learns its full set of certificates Gi. As in the pre-
vious case, the algorithm takes as input the tuples
T i ¼ ðcv ; la; tiÞ associated with the messages received by
the RSE. The attack proceeds in three phases.
In the first phase the attacker constructs a weighted
graph. Nodes in the graph represent certificates and the
weight of the edge between two nodes expresses the like-
lihood that the two certificates belong to the same vehicle.
To compute these weights, we observe the frequency with
which two certificates are seen at adjacent locations within
a certain time frame. The intuition is that two certificates
that belong to the same vehicle appear consecutively more
often two certificates belonging to different vehicles. This
approach follows the spirit of the Statistical Disclosure
Attack (SDA). The SDA was proposed in [9] as a method
to uncover long-term sender-recipient relationships in
mix-based anonymous communications networks.
Let us consider two certificates cv and cw. The weight of
the edge between nodes cv and cw is incremented by one
for each pair of tuples fT i ¼ ðcv ; la; tiÞ; T j ¼ ðcw; lb; tjÞg that
satisfies the following two conditions:
1. Locations la and lb are adjacent.
2. Pra,b[tj  ti] < c.f achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
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listed’’. Let us assume that the minimum time to travel be-
tween two arbitrary locations lx and ly is tmin(x,y). If there
exists a pair of tuples fT i ¼ ðcv ; lx; tiÞ; T j ¼ ðcw; ly; tjÞg such
that tj  ti < tmin(x,y), then the edge between cv and cw is
set to 1, as those two certificates cannot belong to the
same vehicle.
We consider a scenario in which a total of V = 3 vehicles
have M = 3 certificates each. Fig. 4 (left) shows an example
graph constructed using this methodology. In the shown
example, certificates c4 and c6 have been seen five times
consecutively at adjacent locations, and thus the edge be-
tween them has weight five. On the other hand, certificate
c9 was used at location lx at the same time as c6 was used
at (far-away) location ly. Thus the weight of the edge be-
tween c9 and c6 is set to 1. If two certificates have nei-
ther been blacklisted, nor seen at adjacent locations as
part of a possible vehicle trajectory, the edge between
them has weight zero. For simplicity, these edges are not
shown in Fig. 4.
We assume that the adversary knows the total num-
ber V of vehicles. Each vehicle vi has a set Gi of M
short-lived anonymous certificates, where M is a known
parameter of the system. The full set of certificates in
the system is denoted by C and has size j C j¼ VM. Let
P be the partition of C into the subsets Gi; i.e.,
P ¼ fG1;G2; . . . ;GVg. The goal of the attacker is to cor-
rectly reconstruct as many subsets Gi as possible, and
ideally recover the full partition P.
The adversary estimates P using the graph obtained in
the first phase of the attack. The key idea is to partition
the graph into V clusters of M nodes, such that the sum
of the weights of the edges within the clusters is maxi-
mized. The adversary’s estimation of P is defined as P^ ¼
fG^1; G^2; . . . ; G^Vg, where each subset G^i represents a cluster
in the graph (i.e., contains the same certificates as the
cluster).
In order to compute P^, we need to solve a graph cluster-
ing problem with known cluster sizes. We first create a
starting solution P0 and then apply a heuristic optimiza-
tion algorithm. To accelerate the convergence of this algo-
rithm, it is important to choose a good starting solution P0.
We construct P0 as follows.
1. We randomly choose a certificate cv 2 C and assign it to
the cluster corresponding to G^i.Fig. 4. Overview of the heuristic clustering algorithm. The different colours repr
appear in the graphs.
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3. We remove from C the M certificates assigned to the
cluster, and go to step 1.
In the toy example shown in Fig. 4 (top left), we have
V = 3 vehicles with M = 3 certificates each. Thus, we need
to cluster the certificates in three subsets containing three
elements:
 G^1: c6 is randomly chosen at the beginning of the algo-
rithm. Then, c4 is added to the cluster, as the weight of
{c6,c4} (5) is the largest. The cluster is completed with c2
(chosen at random between c2 and c5, both with weight
1). All three nodes are removed from the list of
candidates.
 G^2: c3 is randomly chosen to start this cluster. We then
add c1 (linked to c3 by an edge of weight 1). The third
node is chosen at random between the remaining nodes
linked to c3 by an edge of weight zero (i.e., between c5,
c8, and c9). We assume c9 is chosen.
 G^3: The remaining nodes (c5,c7,c8) are assigned to the
last cluster.
The third phase consists of applying a heuristic algo-
rithm that finds the optimal solution P^. The attack suc-
ceeds in identifying and tracking vehicle vi if one of the
subsets in partition P^ contains the same certificates as Gi.
If P^ is equivalent to P, then the adversary succeeds in iden-
tifying and tracking all vehicles.
The adversary must find the graph clustering solution
that maximizes the objective function (sum of the weights
of edges within clusters), Given the starting solution P0,
our algorithm proceeds as follows. First, it calculates the
objective function of P0 (in the example in Fig. 4 this is
(5 + 1) + (1 + 0) + (0 + 0) = 7). Then it randomly selects two
nodes from different clusters, swaps them, and computes
the objective function of the resulting solution. If the
resulting objective function has a lower value, then the
algorithm rejects the swap, and randomly chooses a new
pair of nodes. If on the other hand the objective function
increases with the swap, then the algorithm accepts the
swap of nodes, updates the starting point with the new
solution, and proceeds to select a new random pair of
nodes. The algorithm stops when many consecutive itera-
tions have resulted in a rejection of the swap.esent the different subsets in a partition P^. Edges with weight zero do not
f achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
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Similarly to [12], we consider the square-shaped reticu-
lar city. Streets in this city have one or two lanes and are
unidirectional. These streets divide the city in identical
square blocks of 100 m wide (i.e., the total area is 1 km2),
and there is a ring road surrounding the city. In each of
the intersections, we place traffic lights and RSE equip-
ment. Vehicles send a message to the RSE every time they
cross an intersection, and they are out of the RSE commu-
nication range while they drive on a street. We assume
that vehicles do not reveal their speed or direction in their
communication. The information collected for the purpose
of the attack is the time of the communication, the certifi-
cate used to authenticate it, and the location of the RSE de-
vice that received the message.
At the beginning of the simulation each vehicle is ran-
domly assigned a home and a work address. Every day, all
vehicles leave at roughly the same time their home to go
to their work, where they spend a deterministic time be-
fore heading back (i.e., there are two peak hours per day).
Vehicles always choose the shortest path between home
and work. They drive as fast as possible (with a maximum
speed of v = 50 km/h) while respecting traffic lights and
avoiding collisions with other vehicles. We simulate this
scenario using the Netlogo1 programmable modeling envi-
ronment and collect data for the equivalent of two weeks.
Our choice of the parameters for the anonymous com-
munications management schemes follows the examples
provided in the schemes under study. For the shared certif-
icate proposal [10,26], we consider a pool of N 2
{5000,10,000,15,000} certificates and we test scenarios in
which vehicles are assigned M 2 {4,5,6} certificates. In
the case of short-lived certificates [11], we consider vehi-
cles have M 2 {100,1000} certificates requested in batches
of b = 10.
When vehicles communicate with the RSE one of their
anonymous certificates must be chosen. In both schemes
[10,26,11] certificate selection algorithms are mentioned
but not specified. In this work we consider three selection
algorithms: (i)One-trip: vehicles use one certificate for all
the communications with the RSE during a trip, and the
certificate is changed every time the car engine is started;
(ii) Sequential: vehicles choose an order for their certifi-
cates and rotate them sequentially for each communica-
tion with the RSE; and Random vehicles select uniformly
at random one of their certificates for each communication
with the RSE. We note that, although the choice of these
algorithms is arbitrary we believe they are representative
of the possible strategies. In particular, the Random selec-
tion algorithm represents the worst-case scenario for the
attacker as no information can be extracted from the order
in which certificates are selected.
We define a set of standard parameters: M = 5 and
N = 10,000 for shared certificates, and M = 100 and b = 10
for short-lived certificates. We have performed experi-
ments in various traffic conditions, varying the total1 NetLogo itself: Wilensky, U. 1999. NetLogo. http://ccl.northwest-
ern.edu/netlogo/. Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based
Modeling, Northwestern University. Evanston, IL.
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V = 1000 (traffic becomes heavy when V = 500) and studied
the impact of the certificate scheme parameters on the
effectiveness of the attacks. For values of V smaller than
500 we set c = 1, while for V = 500 and V = 1000 we consid-
ered c = 0.9 to reduce the computation complexity (lower
values of c reduce the number of candidate successors
for each tuple). In Section 7 we discuss how the results ob-
tained in this experimental setup can be extrapolated to
more realistic scenarios.6. Evaluation results
In this section we present the results of our experi-
ments. We first discuss the protection provided by shared
certificates against the attack described in Section 4.2.
Then we proceed to evaluate the short-lived certificate
scheme against the heuristic clustering attack explained
in Section 4.3. We analyze the robustness of both systems
against the strong and weak attackers presented in Section
4. Further, we evaluate the influence that the observation
time (i.e., number of days for which the adversary has col-
lected data) has on the attacks’ success rate. We recall that
we consider the attack is successful if the adversary recov-
ers all the certificates of a vehicle and recovers the vehicle’s
full trajectory. Once a trajectory is known to the adversary,
it is possible to recover private information about the dri-
ver: her home and work locations [20] and even her iden-
tity [14].6.1. Shared certificates
6.1.1. Strong attacker model
We first evaluate the effectiveness in tracking and re-
identifying vehicles of a strong attacker. The attacker
knows the list of tuples T i associated with the messages
received by the RSE (each tuple contains the certificate
used to authenticate the message, the time when it was re-
ceived, and the location of the RSE device that received it),
and additionally controls the ASA (i.e., knows the complete
set G of M certificates assigned to each vehicle).
Our first experiment compares the level of privacy pro-
vided by the certificate selection algorithms explained in
the previous section in conditions of normal traffic
(V = 100 vehicles) and heavy traffic (V = 500 vehicles). The
results are shown in Table 1 (left). We can see that Random
selection provides better protection than the Sequential
and One-trip strategies. Nevertheless, even in heavy traffic
conditions, the adversary is able to recover all the informa-
tion of 96% of the vehicles. For this reason, in the remaining
experiments we only consider the Random selection
algorithm.
Our second experiment evaluates the impact of the
parameter M on the success of the attack. Given a fixed
pool size N, this parameter varies the number of certifi-
cates k shared by vehicles. We carry out experiments in
which vehicles are assigned M = {4,5,6} certificates from
a pool of N = 10,000. The results are presented in Table 1
(right). As expected, the tracking algorithm performance
decreases for larger values ofM (note that a largerMmakesf achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
Table 1
Strong attacker: success rate for shared certificates.
Certificate selection algorithm Number of certificates per vehicle
One-trip (%) Sequential (%) Random (%) M= 4 (%) 5 (%) 6 (%)
V = 100 100 100 94.7 V = 100 98.7 94.7 93.3
V = 500 99.7 99.8 95.8 V = 500 97.9 95.8 92.1
(N = 10,000, M = 5) (N = 10,000, Random selection)
Table 2
Strong attacker: success rate for shared certificates.
Pool size Number vehicles in the system
N= 5000 (%) 10,000 (%) 15,000 (%) V = 50 100 (%) 250 (%) 500 (%) 1000 (%)
V = 100 95 94 91 96 94 94 95 95
V = 500 96 95 93
(M = 5, Random selection) (N = 10,000, M = 5, Random selection)
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8 C. Troncoso et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxxthe revocation of malicious vehicles less efficient). Intui-
tively, asM grows vehicles share more certificates and take
longer to reuse them. Nevertheless, we note that even for
M = 6 with V = 500 vehicles the attack success rate is 92%.
Next we studied the influence of the total number of
certificates generated by the ASA, and considered pool
sizes N 2 {5000,10,000,15,000}. In Table 2 (left) we can
see that this parameter has little impact on the success of
the adversary. This is because with any of the three pool
sizes considered vehicles share a very small fraction of
their certificates. Thus, the tracking algorithm is rarely
mistaken and the attacker success is high: more than 90%
of vehicles have their private information compromised.
These results confirm the findings in [17]: When vehicles
do not share a high fraction of their certificates, their
routes are easily traceable by an attacker with knowledge
of all groups G.
Last, we assessed the performance of the shared certif-
icates scheme in different traffic conditions, considering
that in the simulated town there are V 2 {50,100,250,
500,1000} vehicles. In Table 2 (right) we observe that, even
when there is a traffic jam (V = 1000), 95% of the vehicles
can be tracked.
6.1.2. Weak attacker model
In the previous section we considered an adversary who
controls the ASA, and thus has information on how certif-
icates have been distributed to vehicles. In this section
we are concerned with a weaker adversary, who only
knows the tuples T collected by the RSE.Table 3
Shared certificates: strong vs weak attacker
Strong (%) Weak (%)
V = 100 94 92
V = 500 95 86
(N = 10,000, M = 5, Random selection)
Please cite this article in press as: C. Troncoso et al., On the difficulty o
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decreases with respect to the strong attacker. However,
in normal traffic conditions, the attacker can track up to
92% of vehicles, and even in heavy traffic conditions 86%
of vehicles are traceable.6.1.3. Influence of the observation time
Our last experiment studies the effect of the observa-
tion time on the adversary’s success. We simulated two
scenarios in which V = 100 and V = 500 vehicles are given
M = 5 certificates from a pool of N = 10,000. The adversary
observes the system for d days, and collects a tuple for each
communication between vehicles and the RSE. Fig. 5 shows
the evolution of the attack’s success rate with the number
of days of observation (d ranges from 1 to 14 days).
As expected, the success rate of the attacker increases as
more information is available. When the groups G are
known (strong attacker), after two days the tuples that1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
0
10
20
30
Days observed
Strong 100 cars
Strong 500 cars
Weak 100 cars
Weak 500 cars
Fig. 5. Strong vs weak attacker: Influence of observation time on the
success rate of the attack (N = 10,000, M = 5, Random selection).
f achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
Table 4
Strong attacker: success rate for short-lived certificates.
Number vehicles in the system Number of certificates M
V= 50 (%) 100 (%) 250 (%) 500 (%) 1000 (%) M= 100 (%) 1000
Full 97 96 89 88 49 V = 100 96 0
Partial 1 2 4 5 23 V = 500 93 0
(N = 10,000, M = 100, Random selection) (N = 10,000, Random selection)
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Fig. 6. Strong attack: success rate for short-lived certificates. Influence of
observation time (M = 100, b = 10).
C. Troncoso et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 9the adversary is able to cluster together are enough to
learn the home and work locations of most vehicles (and
thus identify their drivers [17]), and to track their move-
ments in the city. The small percentage (around 3%) of
vehicles that are not fully tracked by the adversary corre-
spond to those who cross a vehicle with which they do
share a certificate.
The observation time, however, has great impact on the
success of the weak attacker. In light traffic conditions, we
can see that on the first day the attacker only succeeds
compromises 39% of the vehicles (learning their full set
of certificates, their home and work, and their exact trajec-
tories). This percentage increases up to 94% after one week,
and reaches the same level of success as the strong attacker
by the end of the observation period. With V = 500
vehicles, the attacker compromises 77% of the vehicles
after one week, and 87% after two weeks.
6.2. Short-lived certificates
6.2.1. Strong attacker model
In the case of short-lived certificates, an adversary con-
trolling the ASA knows which certificates were issued in
the same batch. This information can be used to improve
the clustering process described in Section 4.3, as certifi-
cates in the same batch can be directly classified as belong-
ing to the same vehicle. Thus the attacker does not need to
cluster M certificates to identify one vehicle, but only
b =M/b batches.
Our first experiment studies the influence of traffic den-
sity on the adversary’s success. We carry out the attack
when V 2 {50,100,250,500,1000} vehicles drive in the city,
assigning M = 100 certificates to each vehicle in batches of
b = 10. In the first row of Table 4 (left) we can see how
increasing the number of vehicles decreases the success
of the attack. If traffic is heavy, more vehicles meet at inter-
sections. Thus, each time a certificate in seen in a location,
it has many candidate successors to form a trajectory. This
introduces noise in the graph created in the first phase of
the attack and worsens its effectiveness. Nevertheless,
even in a very congested situation (V = 1000) the attacker
is able to fully compromise nearly half of the vehicles.
The second row in Table 4 (left) represents the percentage
of vehicles for which the attacker obtains partial informa-
tion (defined as more than half of the vehicle’s certificates).
In a second experiment we evaluate the influence of M
on the performance of the attack, considering batches of
b = 10 certificates. Table 4 (right) shows the success rate
of the attack when vehicles possess M = 100 and
M = 1000 certificates. We can see that increasing thePlease cite this article in press as: C. Troncoso et al., On the difficulty o
Netw. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2011.05.004number of certificates completely stops the attack, as pairs
of certificates from the same vehicle do not appear consec-
utively very often. As noted in [17] however, increasing M
affects both the communication overhead (the Certificate
Revocation List becomes very large) and the effectiveness
of the revocation mechanism (a large number of revoca-
tions is needed to fully remove a malicious user from the
system).
6.2.2. Weak attacker model
The weak attacker does not succeed in tracking vehicles
for M = 100 in our experimental setting (note that this
experiment is equivalent to considering a strong attacker
with M = 1000 and b = 10, as shown in Table 4 (right)).
We note that the short-lived certificate scheme in [11] is
designed to provide privacy towards the strong attacker,
and thus our attack still succeeds in compromising the
security of the system in its own threat model.
6.2.3. Influence of the observation time
Following the indications in [11] we considered that
certificates have a lifetime of two weeks. In this simulation
vehicles only travel during weekdays (a conservative esti-
mate), and thus the adversary has data for only ten days.
Fig. 6 shows the percentage of vehicles whose full set of
certificates is compromised as a function of time. In normal
traffic conditions (V = 100), data from one day is sufficient
to fully compromise 40% of the vehicles. After two days
this percentage grows up to 74%. After six days, the adver-
sary knows the full set of certificates of every vehicle.f achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
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mise 40% of the vehicles, and three days to compromise
73%. By the time the certificates expire, the full set of
certificates of every car is known to the attacker. Note that
this allows the adversary to fully trace the movements of
the vehicles for the full two weeks (the adversary can go
back to the observations and link each message to the vehi-
cle that sent it).7. Discussion
Wehavemade some simplifying assumptions in the sim-
ulation scenario chosen for the evaluation. In this sectionwe
review these assumptions and discuss the implications of
our results for real world deployments. We also indicate
ways inwhich thebasicattackspresented in thispaper could
be extended to further improve their effectiveness.
We have considered a scenario in which there are more
intersections than one would expect in the average town.
We note that the higher the number of intersections, the
harder it is to track vehicles, as they can change direction
more frequently and mix with more vehicles. We have
placed RSE on each intersection, and assumed that vehicles
always send amessage to the RSEwhen they are in its range
ofcommunication.Existing realworlddeploymentsmaynot
have such an exhaustive coverage of all intersections,
although we can expect the tendency to be towards greater
coverage. A lower density of RSE naturally decreases the
effectiveness of attacks, although they can still be deployed.
Theattackspresented in thispapercouldbe triviallyadapted
to scenarioswith lower RSE density by computing the prob-
ability distribution of the time needed to travel between
each pair of RSE devices. The exact impact of reducing the
number of RSE’s in the system on the attacker’s capability
to track vehicles is left as subject for future work.
With respect to vehicle behavior, we have considered a
very simple model: vehicles make two trips a day, from
home to work and back; and the number of vehicles in
the town is constant, with no vehicles traveling to or from
outside the considered area of a square kilometer, which
represents a small town. In real world scenarios, some
vehicles make many more trips per day, and travel to a
variety of destinations. Some other vehicles on the other
hand, are used only occasionally.
In a country-wide deployment of the IntelliDrive frame-
work there would be a larger number of vehicles than the
ones considered in this work. However, an attacker is only
concerned about vehicles driving in the region under moni-
toring. Theweak adversary uses only the localmessages col-
lected by the RSE, and thus the performance of the attacks
would not be affected by the existence of large numbers of
vehicles in other areas. The information on certificate distri-
bution available to a strong attacker who controls the ASA,
would however contain vehicles outside of the area of inter-
est, and thus the advantage offered by prior knowledgewith
respect to the weak adversary may decrease as more vehi-
cles exist outside of the area of interest.
We note that our adversary does not make any assump-
tions or has any prior knowledge of vehicle behavior (i.e., it
does not assume that cars will repeatedly commutePlease cite this article in press as: C. Troncoso et al., On the difficulty o
Netw. (2011), doi:10.1016/j.comnet.2011.05.004between home and work). The adversary only uses the
observations of messages sent by vehicles and knowledge
of the anonymous certificate schemeused. Therefore, the at-
tacks are applicable to real scenarios in which vehicles be-
have differently. In fact, our experimental setup simulates
a worst case scenario, in which vehicles leave home and
work every day roughly at the same time (peak hour). This
means that every day the traffic is similar, and thus the
adversary does not gain much additional knowledge with
each extra day of observation. In real scenarios, we expect
the effectiveness of the attacks to vary with vehicle behav-
ior, and to be higher in scenarios in which vehicles make
more and longer trips, since these provide more samples
to the attacker. Vehicles that travel at night or during hours
of very low traffic density are easy to identify and track.
The less regular the vehicle behavior (variation in desti-
nations and timing of the trip), the easier it is to identify
vehicles. If a set of vehicles travel together, their certifi-
cates frequently appear associated to each other, and it is
hard to distinguish which certificates belong to which
vehicles. If we consider instead a scenario in which vehi-
cles move randomly, the certificates of a vehicle will ap-
pear associated to each other with a much higher
frequency than to other vehicles’ certificates.
Other factors present in real scenarios, such as
short-term parking or vehicles entering and leaving the
controlled area, would introduce some noise in the obser-
vations that may attenuate the effectiveness of the attacks.
However, we note that our attacks use only a subset of the
available information. Additional sources of information,
such as speed or direction, or the location and timing of re-
quests for anonymous certificates to the ASA, could be
exploited to strengthen the attacks. Given a sufficient
number of samples, noise can be removed with additional
processing by applying consistency checks to the recov-
ered sets of certificates and trajectories.
Our current attack algorithms can also be improved
using more sophisticated traffic flow models. Consider a
target vehicle is seen in a certain location l1 at time t1,
and let tmin and tmax be, respectively, the minimum and
maximum amount of time needed to travel between loca-
tions l1 and l2 given the average traffic density. The attacks
in this paper treat all vehicles seen in l2 between t1 + tmin
and t1 + tmax as equally likely candidates to be the target
vehicle. However, given the traffic density between l1 and
l2 and the exact timing of the interactions between the
RSE and the vehicles, it is possible to define a more refined
probabilistic model that determines which of the vehicles
seen in l2 are more likely than the others to be the target.
The results presented in this paper were obtained by
applying the attack algorithm once to the set of samples.
This gives as result a first set of samples, certificates and
trajectories for which the attack has succeeded and a sec-
ond set for which the attack has failed (i.e., the adversary
has not been able to associate those samples and certifi-
cates to a vehicle). One way to extend the attack would
be to remove from the total set of samples those for which
the attack succeeded, and iterate the analysis algorithm
over the remaining samples.
Finally, the analysis of real world deployments should
take into account both side channel attacks such asf achieving anonymity for Vehicle-2-X communication, Comput.
C. Troncoso et al. / Computer Networks xxx (2011) xxx–xxx 11wireless device fingerprinting, as well as cryptographic at-
tacks on the certificate protocols.
8. Conclusions
The IntelliDrive Consortium has proposed two anony-
mous certificate management schemes [11,10,26] for Vehi-
cle-2-X communications, aimed at enabling revocation
while protecting drivers’ privacy. Our results demonstrate
that the schemes, optimized for scalability and easy certif-
icate management, fail to achieve the privacy-preserving
properties they are designed to provide with respect to a
potentially adversarial service provider. If implemented,
these anonymous certificates would enable the re-identifi-
cation and tracking of a large percentage of vehicles.
The design of privacy-preserving Vehicle-2-X commu-
nications remains a challenge, specially when the detec-
tion and identification of misbehaving vehicles is
required. Our results indicate that privacy-preserving solu-
tions should be based on one-time pseudonyms, as the
reusing of certificates is the key feature that enables our at-
tacks. Furthermore, one-time pseudonyms would provide
forward (and backward) security properties: even if a vehi-
cle is tracked in a trip (e.g., because it is traveling alone in
the road and does not cross any other vehicles), one-time
pseudonyms would not provide any useful information
for tracking the past or future trips of that vehicle.
Anonymous credentials [8] are one way of implement-
ing one-time pseudonyms with optional anonymity revo-
cation. Anonymous authentication protocols were
initially considered not suitable for V2X due to efficiency
reasons. However, the advances in the field [6,24,4] sug-
gest that anonymous credentials will soon be suitable for
low-latency authentication.
The analysis we have presented in this work demon-
strates the potential of traffic analysis attacks to compro-
mise privacy in vehicular communications. However, our
methods cannot be considered a benchmark against which
improved versions of the certificate management schemes
should be tested. The attacks presented in this paper suc-
ceed using a very simple algorithm. Attacks based on more
sophisticated traffic flow models and traffic analysis meth-
ods are left as subject of future work.
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